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Abstract. This paper examines the effect of salvage market on technology choice and 
capacity investment decision of two firms that compete on quantity under demand uncer-
tainty. A game theoretic model applies such that firms choose their production technology 
between two alternatives: flexible versus inflexible production process. Then they decide 
on the amount of capacity investment: flexible firm makes decision about general and 
specific components and inflexible firm just about unified component. One stage forward 
both enter the primary market in which demand is uncertain and play a la Cournot and 
finally, flexible firm will be able to sell its unsold general components in the secondary 
market with a deterministic price. Numerical study was employed to observe equilibrium 
behavior of firms. Findings demonstrate that with symmetric parameterization there is a 
unique Nash equilibrium in which both firms choose inflexible technology while applying 
asymmetric parameters has the potential to form two types of equilibrium when both firms 
choose inflexible technology or only one firm chooses flexible technology. Moreover, it is 
shown that there is a cost threshold that could shift the equilibria. 
Keywords: salvage market, modular and unified production process, product postpone-
ment, demand uncertainty, investment decision, operation management.
JEL Classification: C61, C72, C88, D21, L13, M11, Y40.
Introduction
Intensive competition in global market and product-differentiation strategies of firms 
force the companies to make their investment decisions in more uncertain environment 
than before. Uncertainty about the size of the market for potential product and the 
purchasing behavior of consumers affect the strategic technology choice and capacity 
investment decision of firms. Actually operation managers try to minimize supply-de-
mand mismatches by considering all available options in the competitive context before 
choosing their production line technology and decide on their capacity investment. On 
the other hand, in some industries of developing countries there are large demands 
for unsold components of some industries in developed countries. In fact, developing 
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countries could play the role of salvage market for some companies that encounter low 
demand realization in the competitive market. Supplying residual general components 
of some products with prices lower than total cost although implies negative numbers 
in bottom line of financial statements of a company has the potential of covering some 
greater loss. Consequently, investment on a modular production line that can further as-
semble a general and specific component of the final product create the opportunity to 
respond to the probable demand for unsold components in secondary market. Moreover 
it can equip the firm with a production technology to hedge against demand uncertainty. 
Obviously, firm should pay more for extra desirability. 
In this paper we explore how the existence of a secondary non-sale capacity market 
(which we call it salvage market) for unsold general components of a producer affects 
its strategic technology choice and respected capacity investment decision consider-
ing demand variability in the primary market. Our point of departure is the Goyal and 
Netessine (2007) three-stage model of technology, capacity investment and production 
games. They show that how a monopolist and duopolist respond to a given flexibility 
premium. Moreover, in contrast with common belief, they conclude that flexibility is 
not always the best response to competition such that flexible and dedicated technolo-
gies may coexist in equilibrium. They consider two firms that invest in two products 
and compete with each other in two markets. We introduce salvage market with specific 
characteristics to their model in which the flexible firm who invests in more expensive 
technology is able to resell its residual general components with loss. Indeed, we fo-
cus on the strategic decisions of two producers upon choosing modular versus unified 
production line. Modular production line (flexible technology) is designed to assemble 
general and specific components with higher total cost but can be used as strategic 
weapon in the presence of demand uncertainty by postponing the production process. 
On the other hand, unified production line (inflexible or dedicated technology) manu-
factures the final product without any assembly phase with lower total cost and can be 
used as commitment device for the producer which ensures the customers of receiving 
certain amount of goods regardless of the demand realization in the primary market. 
Furthermore, flexible firm will be able afterwards to enter the salvage market reselling 
its residual general components with loss, the advantage that does not exist for inflex-
ible producer. 
In order to solve the model we have been obliged to apply numerical approach because 
of intractability of our final equations and integrals. Moreover, uniform distribution 
function is assumed for handling our demand uncertainty. Under symmetric param-
eterization we demonstrate that there is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium such that 
both producers decide on choosing inflexible (or dedicated) technology and produce the 
final product via unified production process. In addition, optimal capacity and profits of 
firms are strictly increasing in mean and standard deviation of the demand intercepts. 
Under asymmetric parameterization we reach two types of equilibria such that whether 
both firms choose inflexible technology or just one firm chooses the flexible technology. 
There is a threshold unified cost around which equilibrium can shift. Disequilibrium 
also can emerge under some range of parameterization such that we show equilibrium 
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in pure strategies for capacity investment fails to exist if the degree of demand vari-
ability exceeds a threshold level. The point is that this range of parameters is far from 
real-world business considerations. 
This paper contributes to the available outstanding literature on manufacturing flex-
ibility and production technology by studying the effect of the existence of a non-
sale-capacity market which we call it salvage market (or secondary market B) on the 
technology choice and capacity investment decision of firms that compete under demand 
uncertainty. We think that it is worthwhile to investigate this uncovered area of the 
literature via a separated study.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In part one we briefly review the 
available related literature in OM and IO. Section 2 explains the basic general model, 
and section 3 deals with the methodology of solving our problem. In section 4 we report 
and discuss the findings of our extensive numerical studies, and finally we conclude 
the research.
1. Literature review
Seminal papers in the field of industrial economics and operation management deal with 
this subject. Production and pricing postponement strategies of producers with respect 
to revelation of uncertain demand are at the heart of these researches, some investigate 
just the monopolistic scenario and others consider duopoly competition. 
Chod and Rudi (2005) investigated the effect of resource flexibility and responsive 
pricing for a monopolist doing business in two markets. By using normal distribution 
in their paper, they show that capacity investment and respected profit are increasing 
in demand variability, a result that consistently exists in our competitive setting too. 
Considering market competition, Anupindi and Jiang (2008) endogenize capacity in-
vestment, production and pricing decision in their competitive model and evaluate the 
interplay between the timing of demand realization and production decision of firms 
with different capabilities. They also establish the strategic equivalence of price and 
quantity competitions when firms are flexible. Moreover, in their model they charac-
terize equilibria considering two different kinds of demand uncertainty: additive and 
multiplicative. In our model we deal with additive shock only. 
Anand and Girotra (2007) investigate the strategic perils of delayed differentiation and 
its effect on consumer surplus and welfare. They demonstrate that in the presence of 
either entry threat or competition, these strategic effects can diminish the value of de-
layed differentiation (versus early differentiation). In their model they let the producers 
to decide on the timing of customization freely considering distribution center (DC). 
Fine and Pappu (1990) evaluate tactical and strategic usage of flexible manufacturing 
system (FMS) under market competition. Tactical as it helps firm to respond quickly to 
variation in demand within a market or to decrease the level of inventory and strategic 
as it equips the firm with a tool to defend its own market and to enter the markets of its 
less flexible rival. Actually in their two-firm repeated-game model, flexibility serves as 
a mechanism to prevent market entry by having the potential power of attacking to the 
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competitor’s markets (grim strategy). Indeed, they show how the availability of FMS 
can make firms worse off. 
McCabe (2011) in its empirical study evaluates the reliability factors for salvage value 
of photovoltaic (PV). He expressed that as PV system prices become less expensive, 
the salvage value can be increasingly important in life cycle economic calculations. He 
concludes that there is a healthy resale market for PV modules that should be recognized 
in project level economic evaluation and as systems costs become lower and lower 
(because of competition), salvage value has more significant ramifications. 
Cachon and Koek (2007) explain how to estimate a salvage value of an unsold order. 
They pointed a quote that describes the economics of selling fashion ski apparel, as 
faced by Sport Obermeyer: “units left over at the end of the season were sold at a loss 
that averaged 8% of the … price.” They believe that choosing a fixed salvage value is 
questionable and its pricing depends on the amount of left inventory.
2. The model
Consider an economy, in which two firms indexed by j, i, j = 1, 2 and i ¹ j, is producing 
a homogenous final product. Both firms are assumed to be risk neutral and maximize 
their expected profits considering the actions of respected rival. Based on the production 
process technology a single firm chooses, it will be able to produce the final product 
via whether the unified process or the modular process.
Choosing unified production process enables a firm to manufacture the final product 
with lower costs and also can be interpreted as a strategic commitment device whereby 
a firm commits to bring a certain quantity to market (Anupindi, Jiang 2008). On the 
other hand, choosing modular production process implies that a firm invests on a more 
expensive technology which empowers it to manufacture the final product with higher 
costs by producing a general component – which can be used in other products- as-
sembled sequentially with a specific component which is specialized for certain product 
based on the demand information of the market.
Following the terminology of Anupindi and Jiang (2008), we assume that the firm in-
vests on unified production process is inflexible (N) and the one chooses the modular 
process is flexible (F) as well. Also we assume that a firm cannot invest in flexible and 
inflexible technologies simultaneously.
Flexible firm will be able to postpone its production ex post realization of demand 
which implies more effective reaction to the volatility of market; so it needs to tradeoff 
the higher costs of flexibility and its ability to hedge against demand uncertainty. On 
the other hand, inflexible firm commits to produce a certain amount of final good ex 
ante revelation of demand.
We consider two separated markets here: Market A and market B in which our firms 
could compete with each other. Market A is the primary market in which demand is 
uncertain and regardless of the technology choice of our firms, they compete on the 
quantity of final output in it. (Cournot duopoly competition) Market B is the secondary 
market with deterministic demand for the general component of the final product which 
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can be produced only by the firm chooses the flexible technology. In fact inflexible firm 
cannot enter this market. Clearly speaking, there is no demand for the final product 
or specific component in market B. Price is also set beforehand less than unit cost of 
general component procurement. 
This paper contributes to the available outstanding literature on manufacturing flex-
ibility and production technology by studying the effect of the existence of a non-
sale-capacity market which we call it salvage market (or secondary market B) on the 
technology choice and capacity investment decision of firms that compete under demand 
uncertainty.
A four-stage game theoretic model is applied such that in the first three stages, our firms 
play a simultaneous-move non cooperative game with complete information.
In the first stage t = 1, each firm can invest either in a flexible technology (F) that 
enables it to manufacture both general and specific components – which later can be 
assembled and sold in market A or supplies the general component with known price 
to market B- or an inflexible technology (N) which allows the firm to produce and sup-
ply the final product with lower production costs and higher commitment to market A.
Following Goyal and Netessine (2007), three subgames can potentially emerge:
1. Mixed subgame in which one firm invests in flexible and its rival in inflexible 
technology denoted by m. ((F, N) or (N, F));
2. Flexible subgame in which both firms invest in flexible technology and have the 
opportunity to supply the general component in market B, denoted by f (F, F);
3. Inflexible subgame in which both firms choose inflexible technology and the game 
lasts until the end of the third stage, denoted by n (N, N).
The superscript expresses the subgame which our firm plays denoted by m, f or n. 
Moreover, to differentiate firms from each other, the firm index i, j appears in the sub-
script as well.
In the second stage t = 2, each firm invests either in a production capacity of the final 
product via the unified production process when it adopts inflexible technology or in 
general and specific components’ capacities when it chooses flexible one considering 
the point that general component can be sold separately in market B. Subscripts g and 
s refer to general and specific components respectively. Moreover, subscript u refers to 
the final product which is manufactured via unified process.
We denote all capacities by X, e.g. mgiX  is the capacity of the general component which 
can be produced by firm i when its rival chooses inflexible technology (Mixed subgame).
Capacity investment is costly and we let these costs to differ by firms. We assume that 
the cost of purchasing general and specific resources be cgi and csi per unit respectively 
Fig. 1. Four-stage static game
t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4
Technology decision Capacity decision Cournot competition Salvage market for GC
Demand revealed
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and the cost of the inflexible resources be cui per unit for firm i. We let the total costs 
of producing a unit of the final product via the modular process to be CMi = cgi + csi 
while for the unified process to be CUi = cui and so CUi < CMi. For the sake of simplic-
ity, we ignore the assembly cost of general and specific component and assume that it 
is sunk in cgi and csi.
The expected optimal payoff of the firm is denoted by P, so e.g. mMiΠ denotes the ex-
pected profit of firm i that compete with firm j in the mixed subgame and invests in two 
general and specific components via the modular production process technology with 
capacities mgiX  and msiX .
In the third stage t = 3, firms play a Cournot duopoly game on the quantity of final 
product they manufacture denoted by q. This decision is ex post because at the time of 
production the firm is better aware of the market demand information. 
The linear inverse demand function for the final product which is supplied to market A 
is ( ),A A A A AP A Q A Q= −  in which A iA jAQ q q= +  is the total quantity of the final prod-uct supplied to the primary market by our firms combined (Cournot competition model 
with linear demand function) and PA is price of the final product in market A which is 
assumed to be nonnegative. Subscript A refers to the primary market A.
Demand uncertainty appears in the intercepts of the linear inverse demand function, 
AA +∈ℜ which draws from a continuous distribution function F with density function 
f. The mean and variance of the marginal distribution is denoted by mA and 2Aσ  respec-
tively.
We denote profit in the Cournot game by p and E represent the expectation operator 
with respect to the random variable AA. Following Goyal and Netessine (2007), mar-
ginal cost of production in this stage is normalized to zero. We consider this cost in our 
capacity decision stage.
Finally in the last stage t = 4, the firm that has chosen the flexible technology can enter 
the secondary market B and supplies its unsold general components as a price taker 
with the deterministic price less than the unit procurement cost of general component 
which is PBi < cgi. Consistent with Roller and Tombak (1990, 1993), modular production 
process is a prerequisite for entering the secondary market. Figure 2 which is inspired 
by Anand and Girotra (2007) visually summarizes the explained procedure. 
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2.1. Problem formulation
Based on the technology choice of our firms which we categorized as three different 
subgames, this stage could contain zero, one or two player as well. We denote payoff 
in market B by n which is revenue minus costs there. Following Fine and Pappu (1990) 
and Roller and Tombak (1990, 1993), we can simply show the technology choice of 
the firms in a strategic-form game by a 2´2 matrix as depicted in following page. 
Matrix entries represent profits in the second-stage capacity game. Backward induc-
tion is applied to capture the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of this model. 
Hence we move by analyzing from the last stage t = 4 considering all three possible 
subgame of the technology choice of our firm. The optimization problem for a firm i 
that chooses modular production process technology (Flexible firm) for any strategic 
choice of its competitor j is:





q Pν =  s.t. ( )0 iB gi iAq X q≤ ≤ − .
Stage 3: Cournot duopoly competition 
( )max .
iA
Mi A iA jA iA i
q
A q q q π = − − + ν   s.t. 0 min ,iA gi siq X X ≤ ≤   .





Mi Mi gi gi si si
X X
E c X c X Π = π − −   s.t. , 0gi siX X ≥ .
The optimization problem for a firm i that chooses unified production process technol-
ogy (Inflexible firm) for any strategic choice of its competitor j is:
Stage 4: Secondary market for general component ni = 0.
Stage 3: Cournot duopoly competition 
( )max .
iA
Ui A iA jA iA
q
A q q q π = − −   s.t. 0 iA Uiq X≤ ≤ .
Stage 2: Capacity decision investment 
( )max .
ui
Ui Ui ui ui
X
E c X Π = π −   s.t. 0uiX ≥ . 
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3. Methodology 
In order to solve the model and find the technology choice as well as optimal capac-
ity investment decision of each firm, we proceed by considering each subgame of the 
model. Backward induction is applied to find the optimal payoff of each probable sub-
game which afterwards will be located as entries of our mentioned matrix to analyze 
the equilibria of the model. For the sake of simplicity, we make two assumptions and 
establish a lemma as follows:
Assumption 1: We assume that both firms enter the game, choose a production tech-
nology and make a positive capacity investment which implies that ( )( ,0) 0A MP A c′≥
for any realization of demand.
Assumption 2: We assume that price is nonnegative for any realization of demand.
Lemma 1: The flexible firm avoids the excess supply of specific components which ex-
ists no demand for it in the salvage market B that is Si giX X≤ or min ,Si gi SiX X X  =  .
Based on the model described in previous section, we establish the Lagrangian func-
tion of firms in each of mentioned three subgames. Maximization problems are solved 
using first-order Kuhn-Tucker conditions, but whereas demand is uncertain when firms 
involve capacity investment decisions, we should consider different states. Each state 
could happen according to the different probable realization of market size shown by A. 
Hence backward induction approach implies that firms encounter expected profit func-
tions in capacity investment game. Expectation operator leads us to integrals with the 
boundaries which are functions of capacities and this fact makes our calculation really 
messy and almost intractable. To simplify the problem we try to specify the probability 
distribution function of our random variable which appears in the intercept of linear 













Also we add a symmetry assumption between both firms on respected costs’ and also 
salvage market price’ parameters. 
Whereas these assumptions did not reach us to some gentle equations, we employ an ex-
tensive numerical study to find out the strategic behavior of our agents. For this purpose, 
a wide range of plausible parameters’ values chosen to represent realistic scenarios from 
the real-world businesses. These parameters include costs (general and specific compo-
nent for flexible firm and unified component for inflexible one shown respectively by 
cg, cs and cu), price of the residual general component of flexible firm in salvage market 
notated by PB and finally M that is a finite positive sufficiently large number such that 
if demand realization were on the upper bound of probability distribution, all capacities 
are bounded. Here M has an important interpretation which is inherently in the nature 
of uniform distribution. Actually the mean and variance of uniform distribution simply 
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are 
2




Mσ =  respectively which means that the mean and variance of 
the random variable A (Reservation price of the market) is increasing in M. For each 
parameter combination, we calculated the equilibrium under assumed subgames and 
determined capacities and profits. The numerical study consists of a large amount of 
instances resulting from every possible combination of the values listed in Table 1: 















Parameters‘ relations: PB < cg, cu < cg + cs
4. Findings
The main part of our analysis contains the technology game in which both firms make 
decision between modular and unified manufacturing process that afterwards affects the 
capacity investment decision of them. Seminal papers, including Goyal and Netessine 
(2007) or Chod and Rudi (2005), despite of some differences in modeling, tried to avoid 
numerical analysis in this phase and therefore imposed some additional assumptions to 
ease the analytical discussion. For example, Goyal and Netessine (2007) assume that 
each firm produces to capacity called it clearance. Numerical approach to solve and 
analyze of this problem considering a specific distribution function is a missing part of 
literature that we are going to cover here. 
In order to preclude any uncovered set of parameters and results, we were obsessive in 
examining the parameters. For the purpose of having comprehensive results, also we 
investigate some sets of parameters which exist numerically but could be interpreted 
hard economically. 
For implementing numerical method, first we choose a reference starting point and then 
apply incremental approach based on the assumed relationship between parameters, also 
try to investigate extreme values of them. Optimal capacities and respected maximum 
profits of producers subsequently are put in the matrix of technology game depicted in 
Figure 3. In this phase probable equilibrium of the game can be found out by comparing 
some explicit numbers representing the firms’ optimal profit. For detailed mathematical 
steps refer to technical appendix.
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4.1. Best reply functions
In this subsection we are going to characterize the best reply functions of our producers 
in the capacity investment game. Lemmas 2–4 characterize the best response functions 
of both firms. Proofs are put in the technical appendix.
Lemma 2: In flexible subgame of the capacity investment game where both firms 
choose modular production process, optimal capacities are characterized by best re-
sponse functions as follows:










si sj sjB si si
P
c c M P X
M
X X XP X X i
M M M M
− − + + − − +
⋅
− + − =
22 4 4 22
0, for firm
jj
B sj si sj sjB si si
gs B
P X X X XP X Xc c P i
M M M M M
⋅
− − + − − + + − = .
Lemma 3: In inflexible subgame of the capacity investment game where both firms 
choose unified production process, optimal capacities are characterized by best response 
functions as follows:
       




X X XXMc X X iujM M M
− + − + − + + = ,
       
22 2 2




X X XXMc X X jujM M M
− + − + − + + = .
Lemma 4: In mixed subgame of the capacity investment game where one firm chooses 
modular production process while the competitor chooses unified one, optimal capaci-
ties are characterized by best response functions as follows: (without loss of generality 
we assume firm i is flexible and firm j is inflexible):






0, for firm ,
i i
B si siB si si
g B si ujs
si uj B B si si uj
P X XP X XMc c P X X
M M M




− − + + − + + + − +
− − − +
+ =
       
22 2 2




X X XXMc X X j
M M M
− + − + − + + = .
4.2. Symmetric parameterization 
Here we start our analysis by assuming symmetry in parameters such that both firms 
face similar cost of capacities in symmetric subgames (F, F) and (N, N). Moreover, in 
flexible subgame each should sell the rest of their general component in salvage mar-
ket with a fixed predetermined price PB (see assumption TA.4 in technical appendix). 
Figure 4 shows the pair of parameters for each producer that is considered as inputs of 
numerical solution. 
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Observation 1: Under symmetric parameterization condition, the unique equilibrium of 
the technology game is the subgame (N, N) that is both firms choose inflexible technol-
ogy and produce the final product via unified production process. Moreover, this is a 
symmetric equilibrium such that both choose same amount of capacity investment that 
is * *n nUi UjX X= , which leads to the same optimal profits * *n nUi UjΠ = Π . 
Observation 2: Optimal capacity and respected profits of firms are strictly increasing in 
mean 
2




Mσ =  of the demand intercept and strictly decreasing 
in the cost of unified component cu. (Figs 5 and 6 depict the result for specific amount 
of parameters.)
Choosing inflexible technology (or unified production process here) can be interpreted 
as a strategic device whereby a firm commits to bring certain quantity to market. Actu-






( , )c c Ms g B, ,c
( , )c c Ms g B, ,c
( , )c c Ms g B, ,c
( , )c Mu
(cu, )M
( , )c c Ms g B, ,c
(cu, )M
( , )c Mu
Fig. 5. Optimal capacity investment in inflexible subgame
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ally the firm benefits more from the value of this commitment rather than any flexibility 
premium it may obtain from the capability to postpone production (Anupindi, Jiang 
2008). Our first observation is also consistent with the result of Anupindi and Jiang 
(2008) that is when 
2 u
M cµ = >  and distribution F(.) has IGFR (Increasing General-
ized Failure Rate) property, which uniform distribution has, there exist unique sym-
metric equilibrium capacity of a firm in a symmetric inflexible duopoly. The second 
observation is different from the finding of Goyal and Netessine (2007) that capacity 
decisions do not depend on variance of demand intercepts. In fact this happens because 
of the nature of specific probability distribution we choose (Uniform distribution) and 
also relaxing a tough assumption of that seminal paper that was each firm produces 
to capacity. The main reason is inherent in the characteristics of uniform distribution 
such that any change in M causes the simultaneous changes in mean and also variance 
of demand intercepts (Fig. 7). Although in uniform distribution mean and variance are 
both the function of one variable, here M, but as it is shown in Figure 7, for M > 6 
variance becomes greater than mean and for M > 3 raises with higher rate than mean. 
It implies two effects which are happening with increment of M simultaneously: First, 
an increase in the amount of dispersion escalates the probability of both high and low 
demand realizations and second, a more attractive mean of market size.
As it shown in Figure 7, the first effect is stronger for M > 6 and vice versa. The first 
effect implies more uncertainty which intuitively might support the usage of flexible 
technology and the second effect reinforces the investment on inflexible production line 
in order to commit to a larger market with lower production cost. Furthermore, higher 
variance and uncertainty spells that for some specific demand realizations, the market 
clearing price will be zero and so the firm faces some non-sale capacities that in the 
case of being flexible producer will be able to enter salvage market and sell the general 
components with loss. Consequently, both firms confront a complex trade-off which 
has a route in demand uncertainty and cost of producing unified component. Numerical 
analysis explicitly shows that both firms dominantly prefer to choose inflexible tech-
nology and (N, N) is the unique equilibrium of the technology game. Moreover, firms 
should take into consideration that choosing flexible technology, within this symmetric 
Fig. 7. Mean & variance of uniform distribution
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parameterization setting, needs two conditions to be more profitable decision: first, the 
competitor also should play F and second the firm should invest more rather than its 
rival on capacity; otherwise you encounter a big loss. Thus playing F has an incredible 
threat for each manufacturer which leads to the subgame (N, N) . Indeed this situation 
is a kind of prisoner’s dilemma game. In the next subsection we run numerical method 
by considering kinds of asymmetry in some parameters of our established model.
4.3. Asymmetric parameterization 
Here we relax the assumption of having symmetric parameterization and let our firms 
obtain their technologies with different investment costs. We can reasonably imagine 
a case in which both producers having access to similar inflexible technology but they 
can have different technological level of flexible modular production line. Actually we 
have implicitly assumed that flexible production strategy is a newer higher technological 
option that tries to strategically convince stakeholders to invest on it in order to reap 
more profits from the uncertain demand in the market in comparison with the available 
inflexible one which is accessible for all firms with same investment cost. Thus in this 
section we try to scrutinize the scenario that both firms encounter symmetric investment 
costs when choosing inflexible technology ui ujc c= , 
but asymmetric flexible technologi-
cal level gi gjc c≠ . Figure 8 summarizes the respected parameters’ consideration.
Observation 3: Depending on the relative cost of technologies and the upper bound 
of random variable M, it is possible to have two types of equilibrium which is 1. Both 
firms are inflexible (N, N) or 2. Only one is flexible {(F, N) or (N, F)}.
Observation 4: There is a threshold cost of manufacturing the final product via uni-
fied production process Thresholduc , after which the firm with access to higher flexible 
technological capability (smaller cM) finds it more profitable to alter its strategic tech-
nology choice from inflexible technology to flexible one which results in asymmetric 
equilibrium {(F, N) or (N, F)}.
Observation 5: For sufficiently small amount of M relative to capacity costs, there is a 
unique Nash equilibrium for this game that is both firms choose inflexible technology 
(N, N).
Observation 6: For sufficiently large amount of M relative to capacity costs, there is 
whether a unique Nash equilibrium for this game that is both firms chooses inflexible 
technology (N, N) or there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium.






( , )c c Msi gi B, ,c
( , )c c Msj gj B, ,c
( , )c c Msi gi B, ,c
( , )c Mu
(cu, )M
( , )c c Msj gj B, ,c
(cu, )M
( , )c Mu
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In this setting two factors actually have significant effects on strategic decisions of 
our players: first, the perception of producers about the parameter M which implies 
the maximum possible realization of our random variable A (intercepts of the inverse 
demand function). It is basically the art of marketing research activities of a company 
to estimate properly this influential parameter which appears in mean and also variance 
of the random factor and afterwards affects the strategic decision of firm and also plays 
role in determination of the amount of capacity investment and respected profits. Sec-
ond, relative capacity costs of two rival firms which explicitly can change their strategic 
technology choice. Moreover, as we are working with uniform distribution in this set-
ting, M at the same time clarifies two facts about the market: first, higher M spells more 
attractive mean of the price reservation. Second, an increase in M increases the likeli-
hood of both high and low demand realizations that is although higher M motivates the 
producer to take the flexible modular production line but simultaneously increases the 
threat of higher loss because of very low demand realization and this kind of analysis 
is reinforced with usage of uniform distribution as we allocate same probability to each 
level of demand realization. Actually this is the main reason that we face disequilibrium 
in sufficiently large value of M with respect to capacity costs in some sets of param-
eters (Observation 6). On the other hand, lower M implies less volatile market which 
decreases the motivation of investment in more expensive flexible technology such that 
in sufficient small values of M with respect to capacity costs (N, N) is the unique Nash 
equilibrium of the game (Observation 5). Consistent with Anupindi and Jiang (2008), 
we encounter a threshold unified cost – which can be changed with respect to M and 
modular costs – that whenever Thresholdu uc c< , both firms choose inflexible technology 
and (N, N) is the unique Nash equilibrium of the game, but otherwise the firm with ac-
cess to higher flexible technological level (lower cM) finds it more profitable to invest 
on flexible production line. This results in the formation of asymmetric equilibrium 
{(F, N) or (N, F)} (Observations 3 and 4). Also it should be pointed out that when 
one manufacturer decides on this strategic move from symmetric inflexible choice to 
asymmetric flexible one, in some ranges of M it increases the profits of both firms and 
make them better off. This result depends critically on M such that with higher M the 
inflexible firm should invest less on capacity and makes less profit in comparison to its 
flexible rival. Actually higher M causes more marginal benefit for flexible firm which 
we intuitively expect.
In our setting, as we focus on the effect of salvage market on strategic choice of pro-
ducers and since the flexible firm is able to sell its unsold general components with 
predetermined price less than its cost there PB < cg, so in our parameterization we have 
weighted the modular cost with concentration on cg rather than cs and avoided the inves-
tigation of extreme scenarios that the main part of the total modular cost exist in specific 
components such that s gc c . In fact, in this case as the revenue of flexible firm in 
salvage market becomes subtle, there will be no motivation on choosing more expensive 
modular production line which implicitly bypasses the attraction of our salvage market. 
Also it can be observed from numerical studies that the most amount of investment on 
capacities takes place in the symmetric flexible subgame in which both producers rely 
on their ability to sell their residual general components in salvage market with loss. 
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Obviously here the firm that access to higher flexible technology (lower cM) gets more 
profit. Although we have assumed that our firms are risk neutral this behavior shows a 
level of risk taking that is firms hope to face high demand realization in order to obtain 
more profit. As shown in Figure 6, profit is convex and increasing with respect to de-
mand uncertainty which also reinforce the idea of risk seeking behavior of producers. 
Moreover, in this case and in the presence of uniform distribution, in higher M, risk of 
facing loss (negative profit) is also high. These are the main reasons that banned the 
existence of symmetric flexible equilibrium (F, F) as with low M it is not attractive 
to invest on more expensive less probable modular production technology and in suf-
ficiently large range of M in comparison with inflexible unified technology, it is risky 
to take flexible technology while the higher standard deviation the larger probability of 
facing very low demand realization.
Conclusions
In this paper we present a model to focus on the effect of the existence of a non-sale ca-
pacity market (salvage market) on strategic technology choice and capacity investment 
decision of two firms that compete under stochastic price-dependant demand structure. 
Actually we take a different approach toward the concepts of flexible production tech-
nology and product postponement. Our model is inspired by seminal previous research 
in this field like Goyal & Netessine (2007) and Anupindi and Jiang (2008). In this set-
ting each firm involves in three non-cooperative games: technology game (flexible vs. 
inflexible), capacity investment game (general, specific and unified components) and 
finally duopoly Cournot game on the amount of quantity. We assumed that flexible firm 
has the permission to enter the salvage market to ameliorate its excess investment in 
general components that could occur because of low demand realization. The model is 
presented in general form, but as it could be followed in technical appendix some sim-
plifying assumptions were essential for solving purposes. Assuming uniform distribution 
function also did not help us arriving to explicit tractable destination, thus numerical 
analysis considering broad range of parameters is applied. 
We show that depending on the specific values of the problem parameters, three equi-
libria including (N, N), (F, N) and (N, F) could arise. It was discussed that under sym-
metric problem parameterization, (N, N) is the unique Nash equilibrium of the game, 
but in asymmetric setting it is possible to have asymmetric equilibrium in which only 
one firm chooses flexible technology. In fact, the flexible firm proves the effect of sal-
vage market in strategic-level decision of managers who encouraged by this secondary 
market to invest on more expensive but better adjusted production line. Moreover, we 
show in asymmetric case there is a unified cost threshold that can shift the equilibrium 
of the game. Also the important role of maximum possible market price reservation 
M is discussed extensively and it is demonstrated that capacity investment and profit 
of firms are increasing in M. Disequilibrium also appears as a result of some specific 
asymmetric parameterization. Contrary to the common opinion that flexibility is always 
a competitive advantage against rivals in uncertain markets, it is shown here that the 
existence of salvage market could convince the managers to employ it just under some 
specific conditions. 
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Several limitations affect the findings of this paper. Uniform distribution is the maxi-
mum entropy probability distribution for a random variable that has no constraint except 
its support interval while in real-world businesses, firms with extensive market research 
activities has some knowledge about the demand behavior of consumers. Moreover, 
sufficiently large amount of M under asymmetric problem parameterization eventuate 
disequilibrium that could restrict the prediction power of our model, even considering 
the point that large value of M with respect to investment costs implies very high price 
reservation that within some range of M seems not very logical. Furthermore, setting a 
fixed price for salvage market is a little bit tough assumption that could be revised in 
further extension. Development of web-based platforms like eBay, Amazon, or other 
second hand online markets besides considering large scale salvage markets could be a 
motivation for further study in this field. Revision the structure of our salvage market, 
considering two products in primary market, add partial flexibility by letting firms to 
choose simultaneously flexible and inflexible technologies have the potential of further 
research.
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